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This paper follows the interpretation of the bankruptcy problems in terms of TU 
games given in O'Neill (1982). In this context we propose the analysis of the Transition 
Game associated to each bankruptcy problem. We explore an old solution described by 
Ibn Ezra in the XII century. Firstly, we study the extension of the Ibn Ezra's proposal by 
O'Neill (1982), the Minimal Overlap solution. We provide a characterization of this value 
and show that it can be understood as the composition of the Ibn Ezra solution and the  
Constrained Equal Loss rule. Secondly, we introduce a new way of extending the Ibn Ezra's 
proposal, the Generalized Ibn Ezra solution, by imposing that the general distribution 
principle in which is inspired remains fixed. The characterization of our proposal 
clarifies the analogies and differences between the two ways of generalizing the Ibn 
Ezra's proposal. 
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1. Introduction
The analysis of bankruptcy situations tries to prescribe how to ration an amount
of a perfectly divisible resource among a group of agents according to a proﬁle of
demands which, in aggregate, exceed the quantity to be distributed.
The main illustrative example, but not the unique, to show how important it is
to model this family of problems comes from the study of bankruptcy situations,
which can be explained as follows. An individual, to be called the bankrupted, has
not enough money to pay back all her creditors. The question to be answered is
how the bankrupted’s belongings should be shared among her creditors, according
the credit conceded by each agent to their common debtor. A second family of
problems which can be mathematically formalized in terms of a bankruptcy-
like framework comes from the analysis of taxation systems (Young [22]). Just
to introduce it, let us consider the following simpliﬁed situation. Usually, each
government’s expenditures have to be ﬁnanced by taxes which are payed by the
agents belonging to the government’s jurisdiction. Let us imagine that the only
way to reach this objective comes from the design of an income taxation system.
It seems to be clear that, in a static framework, the government’s expenditures
should not exceed the agents’ aggregate income. Therefore, the problem to be
solved is how much each contributor should pay if the government is constrained
to meet a budged equilibrium. The last example that we want to mention comes
from the paper by O’Neill [16], which studies problems concerning how to share a
deceased’s inheritance among his heiresses, according to their incompatible rights
on the deceased’s belongings.
In the economic literature it can be found two main approaches to the study
of bankruptcy situations. The ﬁrst one, namely the axiomatic approach, was in-
troduced by Young [21] and follows the next structure. Let us consider a set of
properties that any bankruptcy rule must fulﬁll to be considered a fair proposal
to solve bankruptcy situations. Then the problem to be studied is to describe
the family of bankruptcy rules satisfying these properties. Usually one can ﬁnd a
trade-oﬀ between the set of properties to be employed and the size of the family
of rules to be supported. In fact, the employ of much properties might lead to
impossibility results, whereas the employ of a few of properties might character-
ize a huge family of solutions. The most attractive results are those employing
the lower number of properties perfectly determining a unique solution. This ap-
proach was used, among others, by Chun [3], Herrero and Villar [10], Moulin [13],
O’Neill [16] and Young [22] to characterize the Proportional Solution;A u m a n n
and Maschler [1] developed an axiomatic study of the Consistent Contested Gar-
ment Solution, also analyzed in Herrero and Villar [10]; the Constrained Equal
Awards Solution was studied by Dagan [6], Herrero [9], Herrero and Villar [10, 11]
and Moulin [13]; and ﬁnally, diﬀerent characterizations of the Constrained Equal
Loss Solution appear in Herrero [9], Herrero and Villar [10, 11] and Moulin [13].1
1The papers by Thomson [20] and Moulin [14] provide two excellent surveys on this matter.Bankruptcy Games and the Ibn Ezra’s Proposal 4
The second approach to the analysis of bankruptcy problems comes from an
interpretation given in the O’Neill’s [16] seminal paper. This author proposes a
relationship between this family of problems and a particular class of Transferable
Utility Cooperative Games, TU games from now on. To be more speciﬁc, the idea
beyond O’Neill’s [16] suggestion can be interpreted as follows. Let us imagine
that any group of creditors could play the role of the bankrupted. Think of a
bankrupted ﬁrm and that such a set of agents is buying this ﬁrm. In such a case,
what a set of creditors (or coalition) can guarantee itself, is what left once they
faced the debts that the ﬁrm have with the agents not in such a group. Just to
introduce some group rationality in such an argument, we also assume that no
coalition will like to share a negative amount, i.e. no group of agents is likely to
buy the ﬁrm if the price that they collectively pay is higher than the credit the
conceded. This idea was borrowed by some authors to justify some bankruptcy
solutions because they coincide with some well-behaved values for cooperative
games. For instance, Aumann and Maschler [1] propose the use of the Consistent
Contested Garment Solution,a l s ok n o w na st h eTalmudic Solution, on the basis
that it coincides with the Nucleolus of the related TU game. The Random Arrival
Solution, proposed in O’Neill [16] coincides with the Shapley value of this game.
This relationship between bankruptcy problems and TU games was also explored,
among others, by Curiel et al. [5], Dutta and Ray [7] and Potters et al. [17].
The aim of this paper is the study of an old sharing method for bankruptcy
problems attributed to Rabbi Abraham Ibn Ezra in the XII century. This author
proposed a serial procedure to describe a method to ration agents’ demands in a
bankruptcy situation. In fact, the procedure described by Ibn Ezra is, in spirit,
similar to a rule for cost sharing problems described by Moulin and Shenker [15],
known as the serial cost sharing rule. This similarity becomes evident in envi-
ronments were the good to be produced is a public good, being its consumption
partially excludable. (See Moulin [12].)
The description provided by Ibn Ezra was formulated for the special case in
which the agent whose demand is the highest exactly claims to be the owner
of all the resources. This is, for instance, the case analyzed by Moulin [12].
Nevertheless, this particular case does not hold in a huge class of problems.
Our objective is to analyze how to extend the idea by Ibn Ezra to any ban-
kruptcy problem. This question has received little attention in the economic
literature: O’Neill [16] proposed the Mini m a lO v e r l a pS o l u t i o na saw a yt og e n e r -
alize the Ibn Ezra’s proposal. This rule was also studied by Chun and Thomson
[4].
Throughout this paper we follow the (cooperative) game-theoretical approach
of bankruptcy problems to characterize some solutions. The main concept that
we introduce is Transition Game, which is the “diﬀerence” TU game arising when
t h ee s t a t ei n c r e a s e s .
With the help of the Transition Games we establish an appealing argument for
the understanding of the Minimal Overlap rule. We show that this rule is the onlyBankruptcy Games and the Ibn Ezra’s Proposal 5
anonymous value satisfying a property called Core-Transition Responsiveness.
This property asks that the sharing of any “extra” estate could not be improved
by any coalition related to what the transition game allows them.
Surprisingly enough, and in contrast with our characterization result, we also
show that the Minimal Overlap solution has a very strong shift on its philosophy
since it can be seen as a composition of the Ibn Ezra proposal and the Constrained
Equal Loss rule.
This ﬁnding leads us to propose an alternative way of extending the Ibn
Ezra’s proposal, the Generalized Ibn Ezra rule, by imposing ourselves the un-
derlying general distribution principle in which is inspired to remain ﬁxed. Our
characterization of this value is also based on the idea of transition game and it
clariﬁes the analogies and diﬀerences between the two ways of generalizing the
Ibn Ezra’s proposal. Particularly, the axioms that we will employ in this result,
together with Anonymity, are Transitional Dummy and Worth-Generators Com-
position. Transitional Dummy is a weak version of the usual Dummy axiom, but
related to the case in which some coalition plays the role of clan in the sense
of Potters et al. [17]. The axiom Worth-Generators Composition is a particular
form of composition, which is very related to the non-emptiness of the transitional
worth-generator coalition in a sense that we will made precis in this paper.
The organization of the rest of the paper is the following. First, Section
2 introduces some formalisms. In particular it describes bankruptcy problems,
bankruptcy games and their relationship. Section 3 is devoted to present the
proposal given by Ibn Ezra. Section 4 presents the Minimal Overlap rule. Section
5 introduces the concept of transition game and provides a characterization for the
Minimal Overlap rule. Section 6 shows that the Minimal Overlap rule can be seen
as the composition of the Ibn Ezra proposal and the Equal Loss Constrained rule.
Section 7 is devoted to introduce the Generalized Ibn Ezra solution, our proposal
of extending the illustrative situation given by this author. This section concludes
by showing that the iterative procedure in which is based the Generalized Ibn
Ezra solution is well deﬁned. The introduction of the axioms and our main
result concerning the Generalized Ibn Ezra solution is the aim of Section 8. Our
main conclusions are summarized in Section 9. Finally, the technical proofs are
relegated to the Appendixes.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Bankruptcy problems
We can identify a bankrupted as an entity which cannot face all the debts it
contracted. Therefore, and following this illustrative interpretation,
Deﬁnition 2.1. A bankruptcy problem is characterized by a ﬁnite set of potential
agents, N = {1,...,i,...,n},o rcreditors; a positive real number E,r e p r e s e n t i n g
the value of the bankrupted’s estate; and the description of each creditor’s claim,Bankruptcy Games and the Ibn Ezra’s Proposal 6
to be synthesized by c ∈ Rn
+, whose aggregate worth is greater than the estate.
Provided that we are not going to consider changes on the creditors’ population,





Let B denote the set of all the bankruptcy problems,
B =
 







Given a bankruptcy problem, a recommendation for it consists in establishing
how much of the credit each creditor will recover.
A solution for bankruptcy problems is a function which speciﬁes a recom-
mendation for each bankruptcy situation satisfying three conditions. The ﬁrst
one is that the estate is completely distributed among the creditors; the second
condition introduces a limit on each creditor’s loses, it being not higher than the
credit conceded to the bankrupted; ﬁnally, the third one is that the amount that
each creditor should recover must not be greater than the credit she conceded to
the bankrupted. Formally,
Deﬁnition 2.2. A solution for bankruptcy problems is a function ϕ which asso-
ciates a recommendation to each bankruptcy problem
ϕ : B → Rn
+
such that for each (E,c) ∈ B,
(a)
 n
i=1 ϕi(E,c)=E,a n d
(b)0 ≤ ϕi (E,c) ≤ ci for each creditor i.
2.2. Bankruptcy problems and cooperative games
Given a set of agents N, a TU game involving N can be described as a function
V associating a real number to each subset of agents, or coalition, S contained in
N. Formally, a TU game is a pair (N,V),w h e r e
V :2 N → R.
Given a coalition S ⊆ N, V (S) is commonly called the worth of coalition S,
and denotes the quantity that agents in S can guarantee to themselves if they
cooperate.Bankruptcy Games and the Ibn Ezra’s Proposal 7
We can describe a value for TU games as a function selecting, for each TU
game a share of the worth among the agents in such a game. Formally, let G be
a family of TU games referred to a ﬁxed set of agents, say N.
ψ : G → Rn




O’Neill [16] proposed a way for describing bankruptcy problems in terms of
TU games. His proposal comes from the following interpretation of what agents
can do when faced a bankruptcy problem. Just to introduce the rationale behind
the proposal by this author, let us consider a given set of creditors, or coalition,
S. If these agents pay the claims that the bankrupted owes to the others, they
are free to share the rest of the estate among them as they want. Nevertheless, no
coalition will wish to pay the others more than their own claims; i.e., no coalition
will wish to share a negative amount of money.
The above arguments allow us to associate to each bankruptcy problem B =
(E,c) ∈ B aT Ug a m e(N,VB), where the function VB captures the idea above
mentioned:
Deﬁnition 2.3. Let B =( E,c) be a bankruptcy problem. We deﬁne the coop-
erative game induced by B,c a l l e dbankruptcy game, as the pair (N,VB),w h e r e
the function
VB :2 N → R,
associates, to each coalition S ⊆ N,t h er e a lv a l u e












2.3. Cooperative games and bankruptcy problems
The considerations established in Section 2.2 above allow us to translate most of
the results relative to values for TU games into bankruptcy theory. The way to
do this is very simple; let us consider a value for TU games, say ψ. Hence we
can interpret ψ as a solution for bankruptcy problems just identifying ψ(B) with
ψ(N,VB).
The question that we consider in this section is just the opposite one. Let
ϕ be a solution for bankruptcy problems, then, is there a value for TU games
ψ such that for any bankruptcy problem B =( E,c), ϕ(E,c)=ψ (N,VB)?T h e
answer to this question is clearly negative. To illustrate this fact, pointed out in
Curiel et al. [5], let us consider the following example.Bankruptcy Games and the Ibn Ezra’s Proposal 8
Example 2.4. Let N = {1,2,3}, and consider the following two bankruptcy
problems:
B =( E,c) = (18;(6,12,18))
B  =( E,c ) = (18;(6,12,36)).
Notice that (N,VB)=( N,VB ). Therefore, any bankruptcy solution ϕ consistent
with a value for TU games ψ, must satisfy that ψ(N,VB)=ϕ(E,c)=ϕ(E,c )=
ψ(N,VB ).
Note that this example is useful to show that some solutions for bankruptcy
problems are not consistent with any value for TU games. For instance, the
Proportional Solution, applied to the two problems above, gives the following
results
ϕp (E,c)=( 3 ,6,9)  =( 2 ,4,12) = ϕp  
E,c  
.
Deﬁnition 2.5. Let ϕ be a solution for bankruptcy problems. We will say that
ϕ is a value for bankruptcy problems,o rabankruptcy value, if there is a value for
TU games ψ, such that for any bankruptcy problem B =( E,c)
ϕ(E,c)=ψ(N,VB).
The fact pointed out by Example 2.4 above allows us to state the following
remark2, whose straightforward proof is omitted.
Remark 1. Let ϕ be a solution for bankruptcy problems. ϕ is a value for ban-
kruptcy problems if and only if for any bankruptcy problem (E,c) we have that
ϕ(E,c)=ϕ(E,˜ c)
where the claims vector ˜ c is such that for each agent i, ˜ ci =m i n{ci,E}.
Curiel et al. [5] showed that any bankruptcy value will recommend a distribu-
tion of the estate belonging to the Core of the corresponding TU game. In fact,
from the positive point of view, the Core is one of the most important solution
concepts for cooperative TU games whose formal deﬁnition is due to Gillies [8]
and Shapley [19]. The intuitive idea of a Core imputation is that no set of agents
could collectively improve their share by their own cooperation. Formally,
Deﬁnition 2.6. Let (N,V) be a TU game. The Core of (N,V), denoted by
C(N,V), is the set of imputations that cannot be objected by any coalition:
C(N,V)={x ∈ Rn |
n  
i=1
xi = V (N),
 
i∈S
xi ≥ V (S) ∀S ⊂ N}.
2The condition established in this remark is commonly known as Invariance under Claims
Truncation.Bankruptcy Games and the Ibn Ezra’s Proposal 9
3. The Ibn Ezra’s proposal
Rabbi Abraham Ibn Ezra introduces an example with four agents. The problem
he proposes can be described as a bankruptcy problem where E is 120 and agents’
claims are 30, 40, 60 and 120. The agents are respectively Judah, Levi, Simeon
and Reuben. Ibn Ezra’s recommendation3 is the following:
In accordance with the view of the Jewish sages, the three older




,b u ta l lo fu sh a v e
an equal claim on them. Therefore, take 71
2, which is one quarter
and depart”. Each one of the brothers takes a similar amount. Then




. You have already
received your share of 30 which all four of us claimed; therefore take
a 1
3 of the (remaining) 10 a n dg o ” .T h u sL e v i ’ si s105
6 (that is, 30× 1
4
plus 10 × 1
3) ... Reuben also says to Simeon, “Your claim is for only
half of the estate which is 60, while the remaining half is mine. Now
you have already received your share of the 40, so that the amount at
issue between us is 20 -take half of that and depart”. Thus Simeon’s
share is 205
6 (i.e., 30× 1
4 plus 10× 1
3 plus 20× 1
2) and Reuben’s share
is 805
6 (i.e., 30 × 1
4 plus 10 × 1
3 plus 20 × 1
2 plus 60 × 1).
The Ibn Ezra’s recommendation can be understood as follows: Let us consider
that from de total amount to share [0,E], each agent i demands the speciﬁcp a r t
of the state [0,c i]; once claims are arranged on speciﬁc units of the estate in
this way, Ibn Ezra recommends for each unit equal division among all agents
demanding it. Let us observe that the Ibn Ezra’s recommendation can be easily
extended to any bankruptcy problem (E,c) satisfying that the highest claim is




(E,c) ∈ R++ × Rn




For notational convenience, let us assume that agents’ claims are increasingly
ordered, i.e.
ci ≤ cj whenever i<j .
Under these considerations, we can deﬁne the Ibn Ezra’s solution on BIE as the
function ϕIE that associates to each agent bankruptcy problem (E,c) on BIE and






n − k +1
3This quotation is borrowed from O’Neill [16] whom attributes it to Rabinovitch [18].Bankruptcy Games and the Ibn Ezra’s Proposal 10
with c0 =0 .4















n − k +1
(3.1)
as the share for agent i corresponding to the bankruptcy problem (E,c) in BEIE,
when agents’ claims are increasingly ordered.
4. The Minimal Overlap Value
This section introduces a formal deﬁnition of the Minimal Overlap value.T h i s
bankruptcy value chooses awards vectors that minimize “extent of conﬂict” over
each unit available. The rationale used by O’Neill [16] to propose this procedure
is the following: First, arrange claims on speciﬁc parts of the state in such a way
that starting from the highest claim, and in decreasing order, there is minimal
overlap between them; then, for each unit, apply equal division among all agents
demanding it. This value was also analyzed by Chun and Thomson [4] who
studied some of its characteristics and provided a precise formula to compute it.
These authors propose to compute the Minimal Overlap value by associating
to each bankruptcy problem (E,c) ∈ B equal division among all creditors claiming
as p e c i ﬁc part of the estate, where the arrangement of claims is the following:
(a) If there is some creditor j such that cj ≥ E. Then, each creditor i ∈ N such
that ci ≥ E claims [0,E] and each other creditor h claims [0,c h].
(b) If E>c i for each creditor i, then, there is a unique t ∈ [0,E] such that:
(1) Each creditor i ∈ N such that ci ≥ t claims [0,t] as well as a part of
[t,E] of size ci − t, with no overlap between these claims; and
(2) Each creditor h such that t>c h claims [0,c h].
Before stating a formal deﬁnition of the Minimal Overlap value, and just
to simplify the exposition, from now on we will concentrate on the family of
bankruptcy problems whose claims are increasingly ordered
BO = {(E,c) ∈ B : ci ≤ cj whenever i<j }.
Note that there is no loss of generality in our analysis by assuming that ban-
kruptcy problems belong to BO, rather than being in B.( S e eR e m a r k2b e l o w . )
4From now on, and for notational convenience, we will consider c0 =0 .Bankruptcy Games and the Ibn Ezra’s Proposal 11
Deﬁnition 4.1. The Minimal Overlap value is the function ϕmo : BO → Rn
+







n − j +1
+m a x{ci − t,0},
where t is such that
(a) t = E if E<c n,a n d
(b) t is the unique solution for the equation
 n
k=1 max{ck − t,0} = E − t,i f
E ≥ cn.
Remark 2. Note that, for any bankruptcy problem (E,c) in B\B O there is a
permutation5 π such that (E,π(c)) is in BO. Hence we can compute
ϕmo (E,c)=π−1 [ϕmo (E,π (c))]
The next example illustrates how to compute the Minimal Overlap Value.
Example 4.2. Let consider the next three-agents bankruptcy problem where
E =4 0 ,a n dc =( 1 8 ,22,24). Notice that for this problem t =1 2 , since each unit
of [t,E]=[ 1 2 ,40] will be claimed by only one creditor, that is
(18 − 12) + (22 − 12) + (24 − 12) = 28 = 40 − 12.
Therefore, one of the arrangements of claims on speciﬁc part of the state according
t ot h ep r o p o s a lb yC h u na n dT h o m s o n[ 4 ]i st h ef o l l o w i n g :
(1) Creditor 1 claims [0,12] and [12,18],
(2) Creditor 2 claims[0,12] and [18,28], ﬁnally
(3) Creditor 3 claims [0,12] and [28,40],




3 +6= 1 0
ϕmo
2 (E,c)= 12
3 +1 0= 1 4
ϕmo
3 (E,c)= 12
3 +1 2= 1 6
5Given a set of agents N,w es a yt h a tπ : N → N is a permutation on N if π is bijective.
Throughout the rest of the paper, and abusing notation, π (c) will denote the claims vector
obtained by applying permutation π to its components, i.e. i-th component for π (c) is cj
whenever j = π (i).Bankruptcy Games and the Ibn Ezra’s Proposal 12
Graphically, the arrangement of the claims for this bankruptcy problem is




5. Transition Games and the Minimal Overlap Value
As it is well known the Core is, in essence, a very solid solution concept, although
in general neither its existence nor its uniqueness can be guaranteed. As we
mentioned in Section 2.3, Curiel et al. [5] showed that the Core of bankruptcy
games is non-empty but extremely large since any bankruptcy solution, according
to Deﬁnition 2.2, belongs to the Core of the associated bankruptcy game.
Following the game-theoretical interpretation of bankruptcy problems given
by O’Neill [16], this section introduces the concept of Transition Game,an e w
TU game associated to, ceteris paribus, increments of the estate in bankruptcy
situations. In contrast with the previous assertion, we show that there is a unique
anonymous bankruptcy value proposing estate distributions in the Core of the
transition game: the Minimal Overlap value.
Just to explain the idea beyond the transition game, let us consider an in-
crement of the estate and the associated bankruptcy games. Let B =( E,c) and
B  =( E ,c), whose only diﬀerence is the estate to be shared among the agents.
Let us suppose that E  >E . Note that for any coalition S in N,
VB  (S) ≥ VB (S),
and it must be the case that the above inequality becomes strict for some coalition
S, in particular for the grand coalition N.
Therefore, when considering such a situation, another TU game arises, assign-
i n gt oe a c hc o a l i t i o nS in N the additional worth that agents in such coalition
can guarantee to themselves when the estate increases, we call this game the
transition game.
Deﬁnition 5.1. Given two bankruptcy problems in B,B=( E,c) and B  =




relative to this estate
increment, E  − E, is the associated TU game where the function W(B ,B) is
deﬁned by:
W(B ,B) (S)=VB  (S) − VB (S) For all S ⊆ N.
To characterize the Minimal Overlap value we just need to employ two axioms,
namely Anonymity and Core-Transition Responsiveness.
Anonymity imposes each agent’s reward to depend on the entire structure of
the problem rather than her identity.Bankruptcy Games and the Ibn Ezra’s Proposal 13
Axiom 1. Anonymity
Let ϕ be a value for bankruptcy games. We say that ϕ satisﬁes Anonymity if
for each bankruptcy problem B =( E,c), and any permutation π,
π[ϕ(E,c)] = ϕ(E,π(c)).
Core-Transition Responsiveness is established in terms of increments of the
estate. It demands to any bankruptcy value that the distribution of such an
increment could not be improved by any coalition, related to what the transition
game allows them.
Axiom 2. Core-Transition Responsiveness
We say that a bankruptcy value ϕ satisﬁes the Core-Transition Responsiveness
property if for any two bankruptcy problems, B =( E,c) and B  =( E ,c) with














C(N,W(B ,B))  = ∅. (5.2)
The following examples illustrate the restrictions that Axiom 2 imposes on
bankruptcy values.
Example 5.2. Let N = {1,2,3}, c =( 2 ,5,7), E =4 ,a n dE  =6 .L e t u s
consider the bankruptcy problems B =( E,c),a n dB  =( E ,c).T h eT Ug a m e s
associated to each bankruptcy problem and the transition game are described by
the functions VB, VB  and W(B ,B) respectively, where









































=2 .Bankruptcy Games and the Ibn Ezra’s Proposal 14

















,c) − ϕ3 (E,c)] + ϕ2 (E,c).
Let us observe that agent 1 will not participate in the share of the extra estate,
and agent 3 will not receive less than one half of such an increment.
The following example points out the need of imposing Condition (5.2) in
Axiom 2.
Example 5.3. Let N = {1,2,3}, c =( 2 ,5,7), E =6 ,a n dE  =9 .L e t u s
consider the bankruptcy problems B =( E,c),a n dB  =( E ,c).T h eT Ug a m e s
associated to each bankruptcy problem and the transition game are described by
the functions VB, VB  and W(B ,B) respectively, where








Note that, in this case, the restrictions x3 ≥ 2,x 1 + x2 ≥ 2 and x1 + x2 +x3 =3
are incompatible. Therefore, the Core of the transition game associated to the
increment of the estate E
 
− E is empty, and Axiom 2 does not imposes any
restriction on how to share the 3 units of extra estate.
We now present our main result. It establishes that the Minimal Overlap
value is fully characterized by the two axioms above.
Theorem 5.4. Let ϕ be a value for bankruptcy games. ϕ satisﬁes Anonymity
and Core-Transition Responsiveness if, and only if, ϕ ≡ ϕmo.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
6 .T h eP r o c e s sB e h i n dt h eM i n i m a lO v e r l a pV a l u e
In this section we provide a negative result relative to the interpretation of what
the minimal overlap solution proposes. In particular, we show that the Minimal
Overlap value can be described as a mixture of two diﬀerent principles of equity,
which is, a priori, uncorfomable. Our next result explains how such a mixture is
done.Bankruptcy Games and the Ibn Ezra’s Proposal 15
Proposition 6.1. Let (E,c) ∈ B be a bankruptcy problem. Then, the Minimal














where E  =m i n {E,cn},a n dϕcel is the Constrained Equal Loss Rule, i.e., for
any bankruptcy problem (E,c) and agent i
ϕcel
i (E,c)=m a x{0,c i − λ}
with λ being the solution to
n  
i=1
max{0,c i − λ} = E.
Proof. See Appendix 2.
Therefore, as the previous result points out, the procedure described by the
Minimal Overlap value has a very strong shift on its philosophy: Up to a certain
amount of estate we should follow the recommendations by Ibn Ezra and, after
it, we should divide the extra estate trying to equalize agents’ loses. From our
point of view this is a negative ﬁnding since the composition of two distinct well-
deﬁned rules can be understood as a broken in the underlying general distribution
principle in which a rule is inspired. As we show in the next section, our proposal
on generalizing the recommendation by Ibn Ezra does not consider any change
on the interpretation of how the estate should be shared depending on the level
of estate.
7. The Generalized Ibn Ezra Value
Throughout this section we made precise of our proposal to extend the arguments
provided in the examples by Ibn Ezra. In particular, we impose that the general
principle in which the recommendations by this author are inspired should remain
ﬁxed.
Just to explain our idea, let us consider a bankruptcy problem (E,c).F o r
expositional convenience, let us assume that creditors’ claims are increasingly
ordered, and E is greater than the highest creditors’ claim, say cn. Then, our
proposal is, in a ﬁrst stage, to share cn among all the creditors according to the
proposal by Ibn Ezra. After this ﬁrst stage, we can describe a second bankruptcy
problem (E ,c  ) with E  = E − cn, and for each creditor i, c 
i = ci − ϕIE
i (cn,c).
When analyzing (E ,c  ),w eh a v et w op o s s i b i l i t i e s .T h eﬁrst one is that (E ,c  ) ∈
BEIE. In such a case, we apply the Formula (3.1) to (E ,c  ) and add this value






E ,c   
.Bankruptcy Games and the Ibn Ezra’s Proposal 16
On the other hand, if (E ,c  ) / ∈ BEIE, we compute the Ibn Ezra value of (c 
n,c  ),
and analyze the residual bankruptcy problem (E  ,c   ),w h e r eE   = E  − c 
n,
and c   = c  − ϕIE
i (c 
n,c  ). If we extend this procedure ad inﬁnitum, we get the
expression of what we call the Generalized Ibn Ezra Value.





























































































E2,c 2  
The above diagram is synthesized by Deﬁnition 7.1. Before stating a formal
deﬁnition of our extension of Ibn Ezra’s value, and just to simplify the exposition,
from now on we will concentrate on the family of bankruptcy problems BO whose
claims are increasingly ordered. Note that there is no loss of generality in our
analysis by assuming that bankruptcy problems belong to BO, rather than being
in B. (See Remark 2 in Section 4.)Bankruptcy Games and the Ibn Ezra’s Proposal 17
Deﬁnition 7.1. The Generalized Ibn Ezra Value
The Generalized Ibn Ezra Value is the function ϕGIE : B0 → Rn
+ which as-

































and ﬁnally the function ϕPIE
















n − k +1
,w i t hct
0 =0 .
The next example shows how to compute the Generalized Ibn Ezra value.
Example 7.2. Let consider the next three-agents bankruptcy problem where
E =4 1 ,a n dc =( 1 8 ,22,24); the computations yielding the Generalized Ibn Ezra








t = 1 41 18 22 24 6 = 18
3 8=6 + 22−18
2 10 = 8+24−22
1
t = 2 17 12 14 14 4 = 12
3 5=4 + 14−12
2 5=5 + 14−14
1
t = 3 3899 1 1 1
t = 4 0788 0 0 0
which yield the following recommendation
ϕGIE
1 (E,c)=1 1 ϕGIE
2 (E,c)=1 4 ϕGIE
3 (E,c)=1 6 .
Relative to the above computations, let us observe thatBankruptcy Games and the Ibn Ezra’s Proposal 18
(a) given that at t =3 , each creditor’s claim exceeds the estate, it should be
divided equally among the creditors, and





zero for each agent i and any t ≥ 4. Therefore, in this example, the process
described in expression (7.1) stops at t =3 .
A ﬁrst question that we should propose, relative to the expression (7.1),c o n -








Our next result states that this sum is not only convergent, but it is reached for
t ﬁnite.
Proposition 7.3. Let (E,c) be a bankruptcy problem in BO. Then, there is a















Proof. See Appendix 3.
8. Characterizing the Generalized Ibn Ezra Value
In this section we characterize the Generalized Ibn Ezra value. To introduce the
axioms used in our characterization, let us consider two bankruptcy problems
B =( E,c) and B  =( E ,c) with E  >Eand the associated transition game  
N,W(B ,B)
 
. Observe that the worth of any coalition in the transition game is
non-negative, but the relative position of some coalitions might present diﬀerent
conﬁgurations. We are going to consider the following three types of agents which






(ii) Transitional worth-generators,a n d
(iii) Transitional pivotal agents.
By transitional dummy we refer to any agent being dummy, in a weak sense,




. That is, an agent whose marginal
contribution to the grand coalition is null. Formally,Bankruptcy Games and the Ibn Ezra’s Proposal 19




, we say that agent i is
a transitional dummy,i f















, if he is indispensable for any coalition to generate a positive worth
in such a transitional game. Formally,




,w es a yt h a ti ∈ N is
transitional worth-generator if for each coalition S ⊆ N,










We want to mention that the idea of transitional worth-generators is closely
related to the notion of “clan”, introduced by Potters et al. [17], but applied to
changes on the amount to be shared rather than the static consideration made
by these authors.
The third of the above mentioned categories includes all the agents being not
transitional dummy neither transitional worth-generators. Let us observe that
the transitional pivotal agents are not indispensable to reach a positive worth
in the transitional game, but it is to reach the maximum worth that a coalition
could generate. Formally,




, we say that agent i is
transitional pivot if










The next examples illustrate the partition of the set of agents above men-
tioned.
Example 8.4. Let N = {1,2,3}, c =( 2 0 ,50,70), E =4 0 ,a n dE  =6 0 .L e tu s
consider the bankruptcy problems B =( E,c),a n dB  =( E ,c).T h eT Ug a m e s
associated to each bankruptcy problem and the transition game are described by
the functions VB, VB  and W(B ,B) respectively, where
SV B (S) VB  (S) W(B ,B) (S)
{i} 00 0
{1,2} 00 0
{1,3} 01 0 1 0
{2,3} 20 40 20
{1,2,3} 40 60 20Bankruptcy Games and the Ibn Ezra’s Proposal 20
In this case {1,3}, {2,3} and {1,2,3} are the coalitions that improve when the
estate increases. Their unique common element is agent 3, therefore the transition




= {3}.N o t et h a t










Taking into account the previous deﬁnitions it is clear that the transition
worth-generator coalition, if any, occupies a predominant position. However, this
fact does not imply, in general, that such a coalition has a dictatorial power for
sharing the increment of the estate. In the above example, the amount available




= {3}.T h ep o s i t i o n so fa g e n t s1 and
2 relative to the transitional worth-generator coalition are diﬀerent. If agents
2 and 3 cooperate, they can get the total extra estate by themselves. This is




. Whereas there is no coalition not
including agent 2 that could get such worth. This implies that agent 2 must be
taken into consideration to share the 20 extra units.
What this analysis suggests is that, if the set of transitional worth-generator
agents is non-empty, these agents will exclude the transitional dummies from the
share of the extra estate. The aim of the next axiom is the formalization of this
idea.
Axiom 3. Transitional Dummy
We say that a bankruptcy value ϕ satisﬁes Transitional Dummy if for any










− ϕi (E,c)=0 .





The next example points out the need of having transitional worth-generator
agents to apply our Transitional Dummy axiom.
Example 8.5. Let N = {1,2,3}, c =( 2 0 ,50,70), E =6 0 ,a n dE  =9 0 .L e tu s
consider the bankruptcy problems B =( E,c),a n dB  =( E ,c).T h eT Ug a m e s
associated to both bankruptcy problems, and the transition game, are described
by the functions VB, VB  and W(B ,B) respectively, where
SV B (S) VB  (S) W(B ,B) (S)
{1} 00 0
{2} 00 0
{3} 02 0 2 0
{1,2} 02 0 2 0
{1,3} 10 40 30
{2,3} 40 70 30
{1,2,3} 60 90 30Bankruptcy Games and the Ibn Ezra’s Proposal 21
In this case {3}, {1,2}, {1,3}, {2,3} and {1,2,3} are the coalitions that
improve when the estate increases, but they have no common element; therefore









= {1,2}. Transitional Dummy would imply
that agents 1 and 2 would not receive any from the extra estate. However, and
given that agent 3 is not a transitional worth generator, it is the case that agents
1 and 2 generate worth by themselves. Our next axiom, called Worth-Generators
Composition, takes into account this fact. In particular, this axiom concerns
variations in the estate, from B =( E,c) to B  =( E c) with E<E  , when the
transitional worth-generator coalition is empty. Let us suppose that, in such a






































































We propose a particular form of composition, relative to the estate E∗.S i n c e
E∗ is the maximum value of the estate such that, for levels E1 smaller than it,
the transitional worth-generator coalition associated to the transition from E1 to
E∗ is non-empty, we refer this property as Worth-Generators Composition.
Just to avoid ambiguities on the level of estate E∗ previously described, let
us state the next result, whose straightforward proof is omitted.













= ∅. If there exists some inter-









= ∅. Then, E∗ is
unique.Bankruptcy Games and the Ibn Ezra’s Proposal 22
Axiom 4. Worth-Generators Composition
We say that a bankruptcy value ϕ satisﬁes Worth-Generators Composition





































We now present our main result relative to the Generalized Ibn Ezra solution.
It establishes that this value is fully characterized by anonymity and the two
axioms above.
Theorem 8.7. The Generalized Ibn Ezra value is the unique bankruptcy value
satisfying Anonymity, Transitional Dummy and Worth-Generators Composition.
Proof. See Appendix 4.
Remark 3. It is easy to see that the axioms used in our characterization are
independent. Just to check it, let us note that
(i) The Minimal Overlap value satisﬁes Anonymity and Transitional Dummy
but does not fullﬁl Worth-Generators Composition.
(ii) Anonymity and Worth-Generators Composition are fulﬁlled by the Con-
strained Equal Awards value. Nevertheless, this value does not satisfy
Transitional Dummy.
(iii) The next bankruptcy value ˜ ϕ satisﬁes Transitional Dummy and Worth-
Generators Composition, but does not Anonymity: Given a bankruptcy
problem (E,c) ∈ B,l e td e ﬁne the permutation π, described in an inductive
way by
π(n)=m a x{i :˜ ci ≥ ˜ cj for all j ∈ N},
where for each agent i, ˜ ci =m i n{E,ci}. And, for 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 1
π(n − k)=m a x
 
i :˜ ci ≥ ˜ cj for all j ∈ N \ ∪k−1
t=0 {π(n − t)}
 
Let us consider the solution ˜ ϕ : B → Rn
+,d e ﬁned as follows. For a ban-
kruptcy problem (E,c) ∈ B,l e t





and for each 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 1
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9. Conclusions
This paper explored an old recommendation for bankruptcy problems proposed
by Ibn Ezra. The instances used by this author satisfy that the creditor whose
claim is the highest asks for the total estate of the bankrupted. The question
that this paper analyzes is how to extend the arguments provided by Ibn Ezra to
the general case in which creditors’ claims are not restricted to be not lower than
the estate.
As far as we know, the proposal by Ibn Ezra has been partially taken into
account by Bergantiños and Méndez-Naya [2]. These authors proposed a charac-
terization of the Ibn Ezra value on the basis of an Additivity Axiom, on the full
problem (E,c), but restricted to the domain BIE, in which the estate coincides
with the highest claim. On the other hand, the Minimal Overlap value was pro-
posed by O’Neill [16] on the basis of minimizing the ”extent of conﬂict” over each
available unit. It generalizes the Ibn Ezra’s proposal but there is no exhaustive
analysis of it, except a precise formula to its computation, introduced recently by
Chun and Thomson [4].
Following the (cooperative) game-theoretical interpretation of bankruptcy
problems, this paper introduces the concept of Transition Game, a TU game
associated to increments of the estate, and provides a new and appealing ratio-
nale on which is based the Minimal Overlap value: It is the unique anonymous
bankruptcy value proposing estate distributions in the Core of the Transition
Game.
In spite of the previous arguments on the Minimal Overlap value, and sur-
prisingly enough, this paper describes the procedure behind the Minimal Overlap
v a l u ea sam i x t u r eo ft w od i ﬀerent principles of equity: Up to a certain estate we
should follow the recommendations by Ibn Ezra and, after it, we should divide
the extra estate trying to equalize agents’ loses.
Given these antecedents, this paper also explores the possibility of designing a
bankruptcy value to extend the example by Ibn Ezra and avoiding changes on the
interpretation of how the estate should be shared depending on its magnitude.
Our proposal, called the Generalized Ibn Ezra value, can be seen as an iterative
procedure in which, at each stage, a part of the estate is shared among the
creditors. This part is taken in such a way that the Ibn Ezra example is always
replicated: we should divide among the creditors the highest claim whenever it
is possible.
Moreover the paper proposes a characterization of this extension of the Ibn
Ezra example, also based on the concept of transition games. This characteriza-
tion clariﬁes the analogies and diﬀerences among the two ways of generalizing the
Ibn Ezra’s proposal.
Just to conclude, let us stress such analogies and diﬀerences between the
Minimal Overlap and the Generalized Ibn Ezra values.
1. For any two-creditors bankruptcy problem, both values coincide with thatBankruptcy Games and the Ibn Ezra’s Proposal 24
of the Contested Garment value (Dagan [6]). Therefore, both of them can
be presented as extensions of the Contested Garment principle.
None of the two rules is population consistent. This is because the unique
consistent generalization of the Contested Garment principle is the Talmu-
dic value, explored by Aumann and Maschler [1].
2. Both values satisfy a “minimal requirement” relative to transition games:
agents belonging to the set of transitional dummy players are excluded from
the sharing of the “extra” estate.
3. The main distinction between both extensions of the Ibn Ezra solution is
the following. On one hand, the Minimal Overlap value always provides
recommendations belonging to the Core of the Transition Game. And, on
the other hand, the recommendation of the Generalized Ibn Ezra value re-
spect the distributions of any part of the estate according to the restrictions
imposed by the above mentioned transitional game “minimal requirement”.
4. Our characterization results do not require the employ of much proper-
ties used in the literature for Bankruptcy Theory. Nevertheless, it can be
straightforwardly seen that both the Generalized Ibn Ezra and the Minimal
Overlap values satisfy some appealing properties. Among others we would
like to mention:
(i) Order Preservation. For any (E,c) ∈ B,a n de a c hi, j in N,
ci ≤ cj implies ϕi (E,c) ≤ ϕj (E,c)
(ii) C o n t i n u i t y ,b o t hi nt h ee s t a t ea n di nt h ec l a i m s .
(iii) Claims Monotonicity and Estate Monotonicity.
(iv) Supermodularity.
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APPENDIX 1.
This appendix will provide a formal proof for Theorem 5.4. Our objective will
be reach by combining the results exhibited in Lemmata 1 and 2.
For notational convenience, we will consider a ﬁx claims vector, c ∈ Rn
+.
Since we are interested on rules satisfyinga n o n y m i t y ,w ed on ol o s sg e n e r a l i t yi n
considering that the components of c are increasingly ordered; i.e. for any i, j
ci ≥ cj whenever i ≥ j.
Given c,l e tE denote the set of real numbers E such that (E,c) is a bankruptcy
problem:
E ={E ∈ R+ :( E,c) ∈ B}







= E − tE (9.1)
if E>c n,a n dtE = E otherwise.
The following three claims, whose straightforward proof is omitted, are useful
to characterize the core of a transition game.
Claim 1. Let E  ∈ E such that tE 
= E ,t h e nC(N,W(B ,B))  = ∅ for any two
bankruptcy problems B =( E,c) and B  =( E ,c) with 0 ≤ E<E  .
Claim 2. Given E, E  ∈ E, such that max
 
E,tE  
<E  ,l e tVB =( N,B)
and VB  =( N,B ) be the cooperative games associated to (E,c) and (E ,c)
respectively. Then C(N,W(B ,B))  = ∅ if, and only if, tE 
≥ E.
Claim 3. Let B =( E,c) and B  =( E ,c),w i t hE<E  , be two bankruptcy
problems such that C(N,W(B ,B))  = ∅.T h e nx ∈ C(N,W(B ,B)) if, and only if
(a) xi =0 , for all i such that ci ≤ E,
(b)0 ≤ xi ≤ ci − E, for all i such that E<c i ≤ E ,
(c)0 ≤ xi ≤ E  − E, for all i such that ci ≥ E ,a n d
(d)
 
i∈N xi = E  − E.
We are now ready to proof that the Minimal Overlap Value satisﬁes Core-
Transition Responsiveness. This is the aim of the following lemma.Bankruptcy Games and the Ibn Ezra’s Proposal 28
Lemma 1. Let B =( E,c) and B  =( E ,c),w i t hE<E  , two bankruptcy









Let B =( E,c) and B  =( E ,c),w i t hE<E  , two bankruptcy problems such that
C(N,W(B ,B))  = ∅. Without loss of generality, let us assume that c’s components
are increasingly ordered.
Since C(N,W(B ,B))  = ∅, Claims 1 and 2 inform us that
tE = E ≤ tE 
≤ E ,a n dE ≤ cn. (9.2)


















cj−1,t E  
− min{cj−1,E}
 






ci − tE 
,0
 
− max{ci − E,0}
 
Let us select k such that, ck−1 <E≤ ck. Note that, by the above expression



















ck,t E  
− E






cj,t E  
− min
 
cj−1,t E  
n − j +1
+m a x
 
ci − tE 
,0
 
Therefore, taking into account that the minimal overlap value is (weakly)

















cj,t E  
− min
 
cj−1,t E   
+m a x
 
ci − tE 
,0








i (E,c) ≤ min(ci,t E 
) − E +m a x
 




Let consider the cases in Claim 3.








(b) E<c i ≤ E . Let us consider the following two cases:
(b.1) ci ≤ tE 







i (E,c) ≤ ci − E.
(b.2) tE 







i (E,c) ≤ tE 
− E + ci − tE 
= ci − E
(c) E  <c i in this case tE 







i (E,c) ≤ tE 
− E = E  − E
(d) Since the minimal overlap value provides recommendation for bankruptcy












= E  − E
Lemma 2. Let ϕ be a bankruptcy value satisfying Axioms 1 and 2. Then
ϕ ≡ ϕmo
Proof.
Let ϕ be a bankruptcy vale, and let B =( E,c) be a bankruptcy problem. Without
loss of generality, we can assume that c is such that for any two creditors i, j,
ci ≤ cj whenever i ≤ j.
Let us assume that ϕ satisﬁes Axioms 1 and 2. We are going to consider the
following cases, which exhausts all the possibilities:
[1] E ≤ c1.
Since ϕ is a value for bankruptcy games, we ﬁnd that
ϕ(E,c)=ϕ(E,(E,...,E,...,E))
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[2] c1 <E≤ c2.
Since ϕ is a value for bankruptcy games, it should be the case that
ϕ(E,c)=ϕ(E,(c1,E,...,E,...,E))
By Core-Transition Responsiveness (CTR), we ﬁnd that
ϕ1 (E,(c1,E,...,E,...,E)) = ϕ1 (c1,(c1,E,...,E,...,E))
Applying again that ϕ is a value for bankruptcy games, we have that





























Note that, if c1 <E≤ c2, it holds that, for each i ≥ 2
ϕi (E,c) − ϕi (c1,c)=ϕ2 (E,c) − ϕ2 (c1,c)=
E − c1
n − 1
To provide an inductive argument, let us assume that for each 1 ≤ i<j≤ n
ϕi (E,c) − ϕi (ci−1,c)=
E − ci−1
n − i +1
(9.4)
whenever ci−1 <E≤ ci.
[j] Let us consider that, for some 2 <j≤ n, cj−1 <E≤ cj.
Provided that ϕ is a value for bankruptcy games, it should be the case that
ϕ(E,c)=ϕ(E,(c1,...,c j−1,E,...,E))
Hence, by CTR, for each i<j
ϕi (E,(c1,...,c j−1,E,...,E)) = ϕi (ci,(c1,...,c j−1,E,...,E))Bankruptcy Games and the Ibn Ezra’s Proposal 31
Since ϕ is a value for bankruptcy games, we ﬁnd that from (9.4),f o re a c h
i<j




n − k +1
,w i t hc0 =0 .








Because ϕ is an anonymous value for bankruptcy games, we ﬁnd that, for
each h>j
ϕh (E,c)=ϕj (E,c),a n dϕh (cj−1,c)=ϕj (cj−1,c)
a n db yC T Rw eﬁnd that for each k ≤ j − 1
ϕk (E,c)=ϕk (cj−1,c)
Therefore, from (9.5) and (9.6) we get
E − cj−1 =
 
h∈N
[ϕh (E,c) − ϕh (cj−1,c)] =
=( n − j +1 )
 





n − j +1
+ ϕj (cj−1,c)=
E − cj−1









n − k +1




for each j ∈ N whenever E ≤ cn.Bankruptcy Games and the Ibn Ezra’s Proposal 32
[n +1 ] Finally, let us consider that E>c n. In this case we know that there is a
unique t, 0 ≤ t<c n such that
 n
j=1 max{0,c j − t} = E − t.





n − k +1
.
N o w ,w ec o n s i d e rt h ei n c r e m e n to ft h ee s t a t ef r o mt to E. Then, by CTR
we get
ϕi (E,c) − ϕi (t,c)=0 for all i such that ci ≤ t and
ϕi (E,c) − ϕi (t,c)=ci − t for all i such that ci >t ,






n − k +1
 
+m a x {0,c i − t},
where t = E if E<c n and otherwise t is such that
n  
j=1
max{0,c j − t} = E − t.Bankruptcy Games and the Ibn Ezra’s Proposal 33
APPENDIX 2.
This appendix is devoted to providing a formal proof for Proposition 6.1.
First of all, and for the sake of concretion, let us remember the formula pro-
p o s e db yC h u na n dT h o m s o n[ 4 ]f o rt h eM i n i m a lO v e r l a pS o l u t i o n . G i v e na








n − k +1
 
+m a x{0,c i − t}, (9.7)
where t is such that, if E>c n,
n  
j=1
max{0,c j − t} = E − t,
and t = E, otherwise.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 . 1 .
First, note that for any bankruptcy problem (E,c) in BEIE, our result follows from
the description of the Minimal Overlap Solution given by Chun and Thomson [4].
Now, let us consider a bankruptcy problem (E,c) ∈ BO\BEIE.N o t e t h a t
t h e r ei sau n i q u ea g e n tk such that
ck−1 ≤ t<c k.






n − j +1
= ϕIE
i (cn,c),






n − j +1
+
t − ck−1
n − k +1









n − k +1
+ ci − ϕIE
i (cn,c) − t.
Therefore,
ϕmo
i (E,c) − ϕIE
i (cn,c)=







n − j +1
−
t − ck−1
n − k +1

 ≥ 0.
(9.8)Bankruptcy Games and the Ibn Ezra’s Proposal 34
Let us denote by λ the expression




n − j +1
−
t − ck−1
n − k +1
= t − ϕIE
k (cn,(c1,...,c k−1,t,c k+1,...,c n)) ≥ 0.

















































i (cn,c) − λ
 
.
Moreover, we have that, for any agent j, j<k ,
cj − ϕIE





















Similarly, we have that, for any agent i, i ≥ k, given that
ϕIE














≤ ci − ϕIE





i (cn,c) − λ,0
 
= ci − ϕIE
i (cn,c) − λ > 0.
And, hence






i (cn,c) − λ,0
 
.
Note that our result follows from the expression above.Bankruptcy Games and the Ibn Ezra’s Proposal 36
APPENDIX 3.
This appendix presents a formal proof for Proposition 7.3. This result es-
tablishes that the formula (7.1), introduced to deﬁne the Generalized Ibn Ezra
Value, can be computed in ﬁnite iterations.
Before proving our result, we want to point out some facts which will help
with the arguments employed throughout the proof.
Fact 1. Let (E,c) ∈ BO a bankruptcy problem. Let
 
Et,c t 
b et h ee s t a t ea n d





The above fact can be straightforwardly shown with the help of Deﬁnition
7.1. Note that at any t>1,































∈ B,t h e n
 
Et,c t 
∈ B.S i n c e(E,c) ∈ BO ⊂ B,w eﬁnd that  
Et,c t 

























n − i +1
=
n − i

















∈ BO.S i n c e(E,c) ∈ BO, the statement of Fact 1 follows.
Fact 2. Let (E,c) ∈ BO be a bankruptcy problem. For each creditor i such that




Note that the above fact is a direct consequence of the description of ct given













=0if, and only if, ct
i =0or Et =0 .Bankruptcy Games and the Ibn Ezra’s Proposal 37
Notice that this fact comes directly from Fact 2. We now deal with the proof
of Proposition 7.3.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7 . 3 .
Let (E,c) ∈ BO be a bankruptcy problem. We shall show that there exists a








=0for each agent i.
Note that, since (E,c) is a bankruptcy problem, the above condition will hold in
some ˜ t such that E
˜ t−1 ≤ c
˜ t−1
i for some agent i. In order to prove the statement
of Proposition 7.3, let us assume that it is not true. Then, it should be the case
that, for each creditor i and stage t ≥ 1
Et >c t
i (9.9)



































































































































(n − i +1 )
t (ci − ci−1).Bankruptcy Games and the Ibn Ezra’s Proposal 38
Therefore, for i>1,
ϕGIE






(n − i +1 )
t (ci − ci−1)=ci − ci−1.
Since ϕGIE
1 (E,c)=c1,w eﬁnd that, for each creditor i
ϕGIE
i (E,c)=ci.
Now, let consider the sequence
  
Et,c t  ∞
t=1 .
















for each creditor i,a n d
Et = Et−1 − ct−1























Et = E −
n  
i=1
ci < 0. (9.12)
Since E>0, the above fact implies that there is some positive integer ˜ t,s u c h





This contradicts our hypothesis in Equation (9.9).Bankruptcy Games and the Ibn Ezra’s Proposal 39
APPENDIX 4.
The aim of this appendix is to present a formal proof for Theorem 8.7. Note
that, under Axiom 1, we can assume without loss of generality, that the ban-
kruptcy problems to be analyzed belong to BO. Once our analysis is restricted in
such a way, we can replace Axiom 1 by Equal Treatment of Equals.6 Therefore,
we will assume throughout this Appendix that the values to be considered satisfy
such a property.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m8 . 7 .
First, it can be straightforwardly seen that the Generalized Ibn Ezra value satisﬁes
the three axioms: Anonymity (ANON), Transitional Dummy (TD) and Worth-
Generators Composition (WGC).
On the other hand, let ϕ be a bankruptcy value satisfying Axioms 1, 3 and 4,
and let (E,c) ∈ BO a bankruptcy problem. We will show that
ϕ(E,c)=ϕGIE (E,c).
Let us consider the following cases, which exhausts all the possibilities:
Case 1.− E ≤ c1.
Since ϕ is a bankruptcy value, we ﬁnd that
ϕ(E,c)=ϕ(E,(E,...,E,...,E)).







Case 2.− c1 <E≤ c2.
Since ϕ is a bankruptcy value, it should be the case that
ϕ(E,c)=ϕ(E,(c1,E,...,E,...,E)).
By TD, we ﬁnd that
ϕ1 (E,(c1,E,...,E,...,E)) = ϕ1 (c1,(c1,E,...,E,...,E)).
6We can deﬁne Equal Treatment of Equals as follows:
Let ϕ be a value for bankruptcy problems. We say that ϕ satisﬁes Equal Treatment of Equals
if for each bankruptcy game B =( E,c), any two agents, i, j; and any coalition S ⊆ N\{i,j}
if VB (S ∪ {i})=VB (S ∪ {j}) then ϕi (E,c)=ϕj (E,c)Bankruptcy Games and the Ibn Ezra’s Proposal 40
Applying again that ϕ is a bankruptcy value, we have that































Note that, if c1 <E≤ c2, it holds that, for each i ≥ 2




To provide an inductive argument, let us assume that for each 1 ≤ i<j≤ n
ϕi (E,c) − ϕi (ci−1,c)=
E − ci−1
n − i +1
, (9.13)
whenever ci−1 <E≤ ci.
Case j.− Let us consider that, for some 2 <j≤ n, cj−1 <E≤ cj.
Provided that ϕ is a bankruptcy value, it should be the case that
ϕ(E,c)=ϕ(E,(c1,...,c j−1,E,...,E)).
Hence, by TD, for each i<j
ϕi (E,(c1,...,c j−1,E,...,E)) = ϕi (ci,(c1,...,c j−1,E,...,E)).
Since ϕ is a bankruptcy value, we ﬁnd that from (9.13),f o re a c hi<j




n − k +1
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Because ϕ is an anonymous bankruptcy value, we ﬁnd that, for each h>j
ϕh (E,c)=ϕj (E,c),a n dϕh (cj−1,c)=ϕj (cj−1,c),
a n db yT Dw eﬁnd that for each k ≤ j − 1
ϕk (E,c)=ϕk (cj−1,c).
Therefore, from (9.14) and (9.15) we get
E − cj−1 =
 
h∈N
[ϕh (E,c) − ϕh (cj−1,c)] =
=( n − j +1 )
 






n − j +1
+ ϕj (cj−1,c)=
E − cj−1









n − k +1





For each j ∈ N whenever E ≤ cn.
Case n+1 .− Finally, let us consider that E>c n.
Let us construct the sequence
 
ct ∞
t=0 such that c0 = c,a n df o rt ≥ 1
ct






n ,c t  
. By WGC we ﬁnd that
































which completes our characterization for the Generalized Ibn Ezra Value.